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Abstract. The paper introduces a model of how workers rationally decide to which 
country within an area of monetary and economic integration they will move for 
the purposes of living and working. Since Mundell accomplished his pivotal re-
spective analyses, the Optimal Currency Area (OCA) literature has highlighted the 
importance of the reallocation of the labour force within common currency are-
as in order to cushion asymmetric shocks. However, several studies have put into 
question whether such a mobility may be considered adequately effective and ef-
ficient within the Euro Zone and, hence, political solutions have been urgently re-
quested. This paper, using the concept of employment protection legislation (EPL), 
looks at the impact of the different flexibility degrees applied among national la-
bour markets on the international labour movements within the Euro Zone, and 
it then proposes a reform of such in terms of the degrees of flexibility that could 
achieve the optimal point.  
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1. Introduction
Over the latest two decades, the migration flows 
mainly directed to the countries of the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) have redesigned the anthropology of the 
so-called Western world, while they have simulta-
neously engineered the international mobility rules 
and trends. The socio-economic gap between de-
veloped and developing countries, along with oth-
er similar factors such as the migration costs borne 
by either the receiving countries or the migrants 
themselves, fuel the mobility in discussion. The re-
spective data collection is still limited; however, it 
is urgent for the receiving states to promote rele-
vant research that aims at improving the handling 
of migration flows to enhance social order, stability 
and citizens’ quality of life (Ortega and Peri, 2012).
The present study focuses on countries where the 
free mobility of workers is already a reality and con-
siders the impact of the EPL on such flows, rather 
than (given the data availability problems) analys-
ing the effect of migratory policies on labour force 
flows. In particular, we study the most advanced 
case of economic integration – the Eurozone. La-
bour mobility is especially important in the context 
of the latter as a traditional mechanism of adjust-
ment to asymmetric economic shocks. Mobility 
usually absorbs a certain amount of the asymmet-
ric shocks over time. Similarly, movements associat-
ed with these shocks have increased because of the 
euro-monetary integration, and have a direct im-
pact on wages due to such respective adjustments 
(Arpaia et al., 2016).
The latest Eurozone financial crisis is a charac-
teristic long-term macro-economic shock carrying 
over asymmetric effects. This development causes 
severe distress to governments, which suffer com-
petitive internal devaluation and unemployment. 
Labour mobility alleviates the turmoil; therefore, 
the way to manage such mobility is a crucial issue 
for the mitigation of the harmful social effects of 
the crisis. Plenty of gravity models correlate worker 
mobility, unemployment and wages (Karkazis and 
Baltos, 2018). In addition, lifting labour market re-
strictions for new member states consequently in-
creased migration flows, while at the same time the 
older EU members continuously deepen their la-
bour market integration capabilities (Arpaia et al., 
2018).
R.A. Mundell (Mundell, 1961) already stated the 
importance of labour mobility within an OCA in 
order to cushion asymmetric shock. A multi-level 
and rich literature has already dealt with this top-
ic and a considerable part of it has focused on the 
role of labour mobility inside an OCA. Meanwhile, 
J. Pelkmans (Pelkmans, 2006), as well as R.E. Bald-
win and C. Wyplosz (Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2015a), 
stressed that in areas of economic integration, if 
there is free mobility of workers, labour markets 
clear across countries, leading to a final equilibri-
um where, initially, wages and unemployment rates 
must be the same. Recently, P. De Grauwe and Y. 
Ji (De Grauwe and Ji, 2016) have proven that la-
bour mobility is indeed an extremely important ad-
justment mechanism in the face of exogenous and 
permanent labour demand shocks that increase un-
employment differentials within an OCA. De Grau-
we and Ji back up the old idea of P. Kenen (Kenen, 
1969), who, acknowledging that labour mobili-
ty might not always be large enough to absorb a 
shock, proposed the creation of fiscal transfers to 
tackle asymmetric shocks within a monetary union.
Recently, thanks to the improvement in data 
quality and on the grounds of the large asymmet-
ric crisis suffered by the Eurozone, there has been 
an immense effort to clarify the factors driving the 
flows of workers in Europe. Most of them go beyond 
the traditional economic motivation behind labour 
migration. E. Sprenger (Sprenger, 2013) has pointed 
out the importance of some of these variables, such 
as linguistic proximity, immigrant networks and ge-
ographic factors. Moreover, M. Kahanec (Kahanec, 
2013) focuses on the effect of institutional variables 
regarding mobility of workers within the EU. His re-
sults conclude that lifting labour market restrictions 
incentivises inflows of workers from new member 
states, although to a smaller extent than accession to 
the EU itself. On the other hand, A. Arpaia (Arpaia 
et al., 2016) analysed whether the movement of la-
bour force within the Eurozone is an adequate tool 
to counteract asymmetric shocks. He contends that, 
although unemployment and activity rates absorb 
most of the shock, the responsiveness of labour mo-
bility and wages to asymmetric crises has increased 
since the beginning of the EMU. In this sense, he 
estimates that 25% of such shocks are cushioned by 
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labour force migration in one year and this reach-
es 50% after five years. Finally, A. Arpaia (Arpaia 
et al., 2018) investigates other institutional features 
that have shaped worker mobility in Europe and its 
responsiveness to the current point of the business 
cycle. He confirms that labour migration has be-
come increasingly responsive to unemployment af-
ter the adoption of the common currency.
Although there is broad empirical work on the 
field of drivers behind mobility of workers in an 
Economic and Monetary Union, little progress has 
been achieved in order to build a theory that ex-
plains how regulation of a national labour market 
and worker mobility interact. Moreover, the evi-
dence shows a limited consideration of the effects 
stemming from such an important instrument of 
labour policy as is the EPL. They also demonstrate 
the absence of analyses on how EPL influences the 
economic conditions behind workers’ decisions on 
where to live and work. Therefore, the main purpose 
of this paper is to contribute to the development of 
a theoretical framework that explains labour mobil-
ity within Economic and Monetary Unions. Moreo-
ver, we investigate the channels, arising from such a 
theoretical framework, through which endogenous 
country conditions, in particular EPL, affect funda-
mental economic variables and thus the decision of 
workers on where to live.
2. Material and Research Methods
The aim of the current study, as mentioned above, 
is to clarify the effect that EPL exerts over labour 
mobility within an EMU, i.e. how EPL influences 
workers’ decisions about where to work and live. 
In order to do so, we start by reviewing the liter-
ature in a way that establishes a theoretical chan-
nel between EPL and labour mobility. The literature 
review helps to identify other factors, apart from 
the EPL, that determine labour mobility. The cur-
rent research relies on the methodological tools 
introduced by the literature about labour mobili-
ty. Secondly, the paper builds up a micro-econom-
ic model that makes explicit the channels through 
which EPL affects labour force reallocation. The pa-
per starts with a deterministic model that is later 
generalised to a stochastic model, considering un-
employment. In any case, we pinpoint the assump-
tions behind the respective models. In a third step, 
the model is tested using econometric techniques, 
and a gap analysis is provided in order to show the 
deviations of the units in our sample from the op-
timum point arising from the theoretical model. Fi-
nally, we draw not only conclusions stemming from 
the previous analysis but also political recommen-
dations that could be implemented by the countries 
in our sample, as long as they intend to get closer 
to the optimum point.
The statistics employed to test the model are 
mainly gathered from two sources. On the one 
hand, data is collected from the OECD’s index on 
strictness of employment protection against individ-
ual and collective dismissals for regular contracts 
(version 3). This is our measure for the EPL. More-
over, data on “Inflows and Outflows of Foreign Pop-
ulation by Nationality” are extracted from OECD’s 
International Migration DataBase. Net Inflows are 
calculated by subtracting the second from the first. 
On the other hand, we gather from Eurostat the de-
pendent variables of the model and some controls. 
The Net Labour Income is obtained from the se-
ries “Annual Net Earning”, using the average in Euro 
for single people without children, and the proba-
bility of finding a job is obtained as the ratio be-
tween the series “Job vacancy statistics by NACE 
Rev. 2 activity, occupation and NUTS 2 regions – 
quarterly data1” and the series “Unemployment by 
sex and age – quarterly average”. Both series are re-
calculated in units and the ratio is expressed as a 
percentage. Additionally, other control variables are 
gathered from Eurostat. The econometric model in-
troduced in this paper uses the series “Population 
by educational attainment level, sex and age (%)” 
to proxy the quality of the human capital in each 
country, “GDP and main components (output, ex-
penditure and income)”, and “Labour productivity 
and unit labour costs”. Finally, the current research 
also gathers from Eurostat the series “Population 
change – Demographic balance and crude rates at 
national level”.
The sample includes the following countries be-
longing to the Eurozone: Belgium, Germany, Es-
tonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slove-
nia, Slovak Republic and Finland. The considered 
timeframe extends from 2008 to 2015, although for 
Bereitgestellt von  European University Institute | Heruntergeladen  30.09.19 08:58   UTC
Carlos Coca Gamito, Georgios Baltos / Bulletin of Geography. Socio-economic Series / 45 (2019): 45–5848
some periods and participants data are not availa-
ble. 
The statistical software employed to test the 
econometric model is Stata.15 and the technique 
followed for the analysis consists in a Data Panel 
with Fixed Effects for countries to control for un-
observable idiosyncratic variables. Some descriptive 
statistics and figures based on estimated results are 
also provided in order to carry out a gap analysis 
between the actual realisation of the EPL and the 
optimum predicted by our theoretical model.
3. Results
3.1. The Deterministic Model
In the context of understanding the role of EPL, re-
garding the mobility of workers through an EMU, 
we start by designing a simple micro-economic 
model of individual workers’ decisions regarding 
where to work and live. Obviously, there are oth-
er variables not related to the labour market or the 
economic environment that affect such a decision 
(Sprenger, 2013; Nedelescu, 2015). However, for the 
sake of a simple and targeted analysis, our study 
only focuses on the employment and economic con-
ditions of the considered territories. In general, we 
can think that employment decisions are made on 
the grounds of wages, W, and the job’s related costs/
efforts, C (Brown, 1980; Cahuc et al., 2014a). There-
fore, an individual rational worker would choose a 
place to work and live from the set of available op-
tions in a way that maximises his or her net labour 
income (NLI).
Max N LI(v(p)) = W (v(p)) - C(v(p))     (1)
where: v = F (x1(p), x2(p), ..., xn(p))
and p ∈ EMU ⊂ WORLD
and p∗ ∈/ EMU | {p, p∗} = P = WORLD
To sum this up, workers maximise their NLI de-
pending on a vector of economic and employment 
characteristics v = f (x1(p), x2(p), ..., xn(p)) that are 
spatially endogenous, i.e. they are given by the place, 
p, where the activity is undertaken. Thus, deciding 
the place to work and live, workers are choosing a 
particular realisation of a set of variables that, ini-
tially, are continuous. However, since the number of 
realisations is constrained by the number of places 
among which the labour force can move in and set-
tle down, there is a discrete number of finite vari-
ables for which the problem can be solved, i.e. it 
can be only solved in a restricted space of Rn. In 
this sense, the issue at hand is a problem of discrete 
constrained optimisation, and this constraint can be 
identified in the third line of the system. Such a re-
striction limits the range of countries, p, to those 
belonging to the EMU; that is, the Euro Zone in 
our empirical example, which is only a subset of 
the whole range of countries available in the world.
Moreover, two clarifications must be made in 
this regard. The first concerns the rationale behind 
the restriction itself. It can be stated as a general 
axiom of international labour mobility that: “the 
deeper the economic integration – including obvi-
ously free movement of the labour force – among a 
group of countries the faster the cost of migration 
out of the EMU tends to infinite, at least in relative 
terms”. Hence, the differential in wages must grow 
at a higher order toward infinite so that the labour 
force has incentives to emigrate out of the area. 
Since the wage differential is bounded by a lower 
limit of zero and an upper finite limit, although un-
known and variable, migration of the labour force 
out of the EMU is unlikely to happen after a cer-
tain degree of integration is achieved, even more so 
if the tendency of the world to merge into a certain 
and fixed number of regional economic integration 
areas is confirmed (Schiff and Winters, 2003).
Secondly, the larger the area of economic inte-
gration, the more likely that the set of realisations 
included in the vector of economic and employ-
ment characteristics approaches the whole range of 
Rn, though without ever converging with it. This is 
somehow the equivalent of the ricardian principle 
of a custom union’s efficiency, according to which 
the likelihood of finding the most efficient produc-
er is higher within a large custom union, rather 
than within a small one, and, therefore, the trade 
deviation in the former is smaller than in the lat-
ter (Schiff and Winters, 2003; Baldwin and Wyplo-
sz, 2015b). Regarding labour mobility, the larger the 
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number of members in the EMU, the higher the 
probability of finding the country that offers the op-
timal combination of values of xi in a way that max-
imises the NLI.
There are some assumptions and considerations 
behind the model that we must make explicit:
1. By restricting the set of countries that workers 
might move to we are implicitly assuming that the 
cost of working out of the EMU approaches infinity.
C(v(p^* ))→ ∞ ∀ p^*∉EMU          (2)
Obviously, this is a consequence of a particular 
subset of the vector of Xi that shapes the cost of 
working. Indeed, we can split the cost of working 
into two categories as in all types of cost. On the 
one hand, we have the fixed cost linked to the job, 
i.e. the investment (I) that workers must undertake 
in order to get the position. Such an investment in-
cludes multiple economic activities and decisions 
ranging from human capital investments (universi-
ty studies, professional training, etc.) to time spent 
on the job-seeking process (travel, interviews, spe-
cific exams, etc.) and, in particular for the interest 
of this study, administrative and contractual costs to 
finalise the labour contract. In essence, those costs 
are place-specific.
On the other hand, we have the variable cost, i.e. 
burden of the job position or effort (E) for each unit 
of working time deployed. Such an effort depends 
mainly on the nature of the position, the level of 
capital intensity of the activity, the level of riskiness 
associated with the job, etc. In essence, those costs 
are job-specific and not place-specific. Therefore, we 
can reformulate the assumption above:
C(v(P))=I(v(P))+E(v(P))→ ∞ ∀ P∉EMU
where:
E(v(p∗)) = E(v(p)) for a given job position | E ∈ (0, ∞):
and 
I(v(p∗)) ƒ= I(v(p)) | {I(v(p)) ∈ (0, ∞); I(v(p∗)) → ∞}.    (2.1)
The fact that the investment cost approaches 
infinity stems from barriers to free movement of 
workers between areas of economic integration due 
to legal restrictions like visas or quotas (Kahanec, 
2013), lack of portability of social rights (Holzmann 
and Koettl, 2015; d’Addio and Cavalleri, 2015), dif-
ferences in occupational regulation and difficul-
ties for qualification recognition (Sweetman et al., 
2015); but also from cultural gaps and asymmetric 
information problems with respect to foreign labour 
markets (Sprenger, 2013).
An important theorem arising from the previous 
assumption is that labour spatial allocation deci-
sion-making at micro-economic level is not influ-
enced by the variable cost of working (E), since it 
is job- and not place-specific, but only by the fixed 
cost (investment).
2. Furthermore, the variables that determine the 
value of the NLI, as a combination of wage percep-
tions and cost undertaken, are continuous and dif-
ferentiable so that we can obtain the marginal cost 
and benefit functions. To ensure that there is only 
one solution we assume that there exists an x* such 
that:
Additionally, we assume the traditional prop-
erties of concavity for the maximisation of profits 
(wages in our case [W]) and convexity for the min-
imisation of cost (the job-related investment [I]), so 
that a global maximum of the NLI is guaranteed in 
all Rn (Tirole et al., 1988). Therefore, we can ensure 
that there is a maximum at x* where:
Thus, the ratio between the difference of the sec-
ond derivatives of W and I with respect to v7 and 
the difference of their first derivatives with respect 
to v is equal to or smaller than the ratio between 
minus the second derivative of v with respect to xj 
and the square of its first derivative with respect 
to xj.
3. We also assume that there is full employment 
in the countries belonging to the EMU so that 
workers can freely decide where they want to work. 
Additionally, that means that wages met the natu-
ral market equilibrium and migrating does not push 
them downwards at the margin (Peri, 2014). This 
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allows us to focus on the best allocation of resourc-
es without having to consider redistributive effects. 
Nevertheless, later we will dilute this assumption, 
including unemployment, and consider some of its 
effects when deciding the place to work and live.
4. Finally, the actual value of the wage and the 
investment on the labour market depend upon the 
country where the individual is working. In oth-
er words, the economic and employment condi-
tions, which determine the part of the production 
outcome that goes to labour, are mediated through 
some national idiosyncratic features. This assump-
tion is realistic and means that although Spain and 
Germany may grow at the same pace, wages and 
workers’ investment in order to access the labour 
market are not the same, but that the NLI reach-
es a maximum at the same rate of growth. In brief, 
the differences in the functional income distribu-
tion across the members of an EMU arise from 
place-specific institutional features (education sys-
tem, labour market regulation) (Guerriero and Sen, 
2012), since we consider that the EMU is an OCA 
and that countries therefore share a very similar 
economic structure (Mundell, 1961).
After setting up our model and stating the under-
lying assumptions, we introduce the NLI’s maximi-
sation problem with the traditional micro-economic 
tools:
the vector v is represented by two features of Fig. 
1. Firstly, the marginal curves are the same, inde-
pendently of the country, and thus the intersection 
is always at the same point of v. Secondly, the NLI 
curve shifts vertically, down or up, depending on 
the country and its endogenous conditions.
How can the above be interpreted from an eco-
nomic point of view? The issue that all countries 
maximise NLI for the same v∗ arises from the theo-
retical implications behind the rational for an EMU 
(Mundell, 1961). The preceding analysis shows that 
the maximum NLI depends on a vector of econom-
ic and employment characteristics. The hypothe-
sis that such a maximising vector is the same for 
all countries can be defended on the grounds that 
within an EMU we expect a high level of conver-
gence in fundamental macro-economic variables 
and political coordination to avoid spillovers (Bald-
win and Wyplosz, 2015b). Therefore, if the bundle 
of variables v for which we maximise the NLI is not 
the same for all countries, but we are constraining 
them through integration to converge on the same 
v∗, an EMU would lead to a sub-optimal econom-
ic equilibrium. Additionally, the idea that the final 
level of NLI is determined by the country arises 
from non-macro-economic factors. Such factors are 
mainly institutions in the long run and the differ-
ent competitive advantages of each territory, shaped 
by capital accumulation and allocation of different 
types of workforce in the short run. Institutional 
factors can almost permanently offset the reduction 
in NLI differences that is caused by economic con-
vergence and integration.
3.2. The Stochastic Model
In a world as implicitly described before there is no 
need for EPL. In such a world there is no unem-
ployment and the only thing that workers have to 
do in order to work is to decide what kind of em-
ployment they would prefer and where they would 
like to pursue their professional career. This is a 
decision that in the model above depends upon 
the maximisation of the NLI. However, in the real 
world, moving to a new country is not a guarantee 
of finding the desired job. The probability of finding 
a job depends ultimately on the rate of creation and 
destruction of employment in the specific country, 
Fig. 1. Net Labour Income Optimisation
As we can see in Fig. 1, the second assump-
tion ensures that there is a global maximum where 
the marginal wage gain intersects the marginal in-
vestment effort. On the other hand, the condition 
that the final NLI depends on the country but it is 
reached for all of them at the same realisation of 
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in particular in the sector where the job-seeking is 
taking place, which inevitably shapes the arrival rate 
of job offers (Cahuc et al., 2014b). There is a broad 
agreement that such rates are largely influenced by 
EPL (Blanchard, 2005; Pissarides, 2000). We will 
proxy the arrival rate of job offers by the vacancy 
rate in the specific country. Thus, summing up, in a 
stochastic world we must consider that workers not 
only maximise the NLI but the probability to max-
imise the NLI, and in order to do so they should 
have considered the effects of the EPL on it.
We can rewrite our maximisation problem using 
the concept of conditional expectation as follows:
Max z =
= Max E[N LI|EP L] =
= Max {N LI(v(p)) × E[N LI(v(p))|EP L = P ]} =
= Max N LI(v(p)) × Max E[N LI(v(p))|EP L = P] =
= N LI(v∗) × Max E[N LI(v∗(p))|EP L = p] =
= N LI(v∗(p1)) × P [N LI(v∗(p1))|EP L = p1]   (3)
In essence, the variable to maximise is a com-
position of a multivariate function, which involve 
two functions as an argument – the maximum 
NLI and the probability of obtaining it. Addition-
ally, such a probability is determined by the level 
of employment protection (Blanchard, 2005; Pis-
sarides, 2000) while the maximum NLI is shaped 
by the endogenous characteristic of the country, p. 
Such endogenous characteristics, using economet-
ric terminology, are unobservable, but we can use 
different techniques to control them. In this case, 
we suggest using EPL as a proxy since we expect 
it to be correlated with such an unobservable var-
iable that determines whether a country has better 
or worse economic conditions for workers. Thus, we 
can rewrite the previous problem as:
Max z(EPL) = Max z(NLI(EPL),P(EPL))   (4)
Solving it through the chain rule and the fact 
that NLI and P are linked by a multiplicative rela-
tionship:
To sum up, the condition to maximise the ex-
pected net labour income in the presence of unem-
ployment is given by the elasticity of the NLI with 
respect to the probability of achieving such an NLI. 
The equilibrium point is where a change of 1% in 
the probability of obtaining the maximum NLI due 
to a change in the EPL leads to a change of 1% in 
the level of such an NLI. Furthermore, unobserva-
ble variables will be controlled using a Data Panel 
Fixed Effect model, where we control for the idi-
osyncratic unobservable variables of each country.
Moreover, there are two important implications 
on the grounds of political economy arising from 
the previous formulation of the NLI maximisation 
problem in the context of an EMU. On the one 
hand, EPL turns out to be not only a policy instru-
ment that affects levels of employment/unemploy-
ment (Pissarides, 2000) through P(EPL), but also 
the distribution of the social product, since it affects 
the maximum level of labour income that workers 
can obtain (Pissarides, 2000). The effect on unem-
ployed workers is not so clear. On the other hand, 
we must not lose track of the fact that the model 
describes how workers decide where to work and 
live. In this sense, as EPL is a political instrument 
that governments manage and it determines the 
expected value of the net labour income, EPL be-
comes a tool to attract and/or repel labour force and 
human capital from the whole EMU. Nevertheless, 
if we accept that, in an EMU, cooperation should 
prevail over competition, or at least that the pos-
sibility of jeopardising a partner’s economy should 
be restricted, some degree of coordination regard-
ing EPL seems to be desirable.
3.3. Econometric Model and Hypothesis 
Testing
This section examines whether the suggested 
economic model applies to the Euro Zone. In other 
words, both hypotheses above will be put to the test.
On the one hand, according to the suggested 
economic model, it is expected that the probabil-
ity of finding a job in a certain country is strong-
ly explained by the level of EPL (Blanchard, 2005; 
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is how to define the probability of finding a job. As 
we have previously pinpointed, the probability of 
finding a job is shaped by the rates of job creation 
and destruction (Blanchard, 2005; Pissarides, 2000). 
Thus, they determine both the vacancy rate and the 
number of unemployed people within an economy, 
while it can be rationally argued that, assuming 
equal workers and that job positions and unem-
ployed are equally distributed within the economy, 
the probability of finding a job is the ratio between 
vacancies and unemployed individuals. Both sets of 
statistics are gathered from Eurostat. Unfortunately, 
due to the incompleteness of the series, only the fol-
lowing countries of the Euro Zone can be included 
in the regression: Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Ire-
land, Greece, Spain, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slova-
kia and Finland. Italy and France are excluded at 
this time.
As we can see in regression table 1 and Fig. 2 the 
best specification shows the probability of finding a 
job (P) as a quadratic function of the EPL (L, L2).
EPL, when we are at low EPL positions, is small in 
relation to the actual benefit reported by hiring a 
new employee. In other words, the company weighs 
future cost less than actual benefits, unless the fu-
ture cost is large enough. There is, however, a turn-
ing point after which the successive increase in the 
strictness of the EPL leads to such a large cost of 
firing (although it is an uncertain possibility in the 
future) that it will offset the actual benefit of hir-
ing a worker.
On the other hand, the NLI is expected to be a 
linear function of the level of EPL (Blanchard, 2005; 
Pissarides, 2000). However, a specification where the 
EPL is considered as the only explanatory variable 
of the NLI results in the non-significance of the EPL 
coefficient as can be observed in the regression table 
2 (“Basic”). Obviously, this is due to a classical omit-
ted variable bias, which may be correct including 
other regressors linked to the wage perceptions such 
as education level (ED), the gross domestic product 
of the country (GDP) and real labour productivi-
ty (RLP) (“Controls”). Indeed, we may recall that 
the NLI is composed of wage perceptions and oth-
er benefits minus the job’s cost/effort. In this sense, 
the regressors included can be classified as varia-
bles driving the wage perceptions and other bene-
fits, in the case of RLP and EPL, or the job’s cost/
effort, in the case of ED and GDP. Both, E and GDP 
are linked to the fixed cost of working. While E is 
clearly an investment made by workers in order to 
achieve a good job, GDP is a proxy for the level of 
competition in the labour market and therefore the 
level of investment that workers must undertake in 
order to achieve a job.
Another specification of the NLI checks if it is 
explained by a quadratic term of the EPL (L2). It 
can be observed in regression table 2, that the quad-
ratic term is not significant in this case (“Quadrat-
ic” and “Parsimonious”). Furthermore, the RLP is 
not a good predictor of the wage within Euro Zone 
countries (“Quadratic” and “Parsimonious”). Such 
a result is in line with our model, since we are in-
troducing institutional rigidities, i.e. the EPL. Thus, 
salaries are not set according to the marginal pro-
ductivity of labour as it is contended by the neoclas-
sical postulates. Besides that, the linear relationship 
between the NLI and the EPL is confirmed and dis-
played in Fig. 3 below. We would like to remark that 
Fig. 2. Probability of finding a job
Thus, there is a level of EPL that maximises such 
a probability, and it is 4.03 in our sample. Getting 
back on track with Pissarides’ model (Pissarides, 
2000), which states that EPL has an ambiguous ef-
fect over the probability of finding a job since it 
decreases job creation and destruction, the current 
results appear logical, using the marginalist theory. 
Job destruction supposes a potential future cost for 
companies while hiring a new employee entails a 
more-or-less direct actual benefit in term of produc-
tion and sales. In this sense, the marginal increase 
in the potential cost of firing due to an increase in 
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Table 1. Regression table 1
Table 2. Regression table 2
Basic Controls Quadratic Parsimonious Final
NLI NLI NLI NLI NLI
L -179.6 2432.0∗∗∗ -4197.5 -4426.7 2385.0∗∗∗
(-0.22) (3.04) (-0.82) (-0.88)
(3.01)
ED 301.7∗∗∗ (5.72) 322.0
∗∗∗ 














Constant 21132.8∗∗∗ -12514.9∗∗ -4729.0 -3382.7 -11096.3∗∗
(9.62) (-2.27) (-0.59) (-0.45)
(-2.28)
Observations 95 95 95 95 95









t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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in this case data availability allows all Euro Zone 
members to be included.
Finally, we display the functions estimated in a 
more readable form and we use them to calculate 
equation 6 in our sample at the average:
P = −27.29 + 24.61 × L − 3.05 × L2         (7)
N LI = −11096.26 + 2385.04 × L +
+ 3003.80 × ED + 0.007 × GDP         (8)
Hence,
techniques. In this sense, we build up a very parsi-
monious log gravity model, displayed in regression 
table 4 above, where distance is not considered and 
there are only two mass factors – the country’s pop-
ulation and its expected NLI. We can conclude that 
both the migration inflow and the net migration 
are explained by the expected NLI, although in the 
second case population is not a significant varia-
ble. A 1% increase in the expected NLI leads to a 
0.80% increase in the migration inflow and a 1.78% 
in net migration. However, we recall that we have 
used only average data in these regressions.
A visual insight is provided by Fig. 4. The graphs 
on the left show the regression line for the whole 
sample available, while on the right we leave Ger-
many out of the sample since it could be considered 
an outlier. However, the results do not change and, 
again, through the average for 2008–2015, we can 
observe that the higher the expected NLI the high-
er the IM and NM are. The fit is particularly good 
for the NM, Germany included.
It would be interesting for future studies to test 
if there is a difference in the way that the NLI and 
the probability of finding a job reacts to changes in 
the EPL before and after joining an EMU. Never-
theless, due to limited space and lack of data avail-
able, we must leave this point for future studies. 
Additionally, the lack of consistent and homogene-
ous data on migration of EU workers within the 
Euro Zone makes it difficult to econometrically test 
whether workers move to countries within the Euro 
Zone that maximise their expected NLI. The fact 
that some countries, like France, Greece or Ireland, 
do not systematically register workers coming from 
other Euro Zone or EU countries, leads to doubt as 
to the completeness of such an analysis. Maybe fu-
ture surveys and data collection works will get over 
this problem allowing empirical research to be car-
ried out on that issue. In this sense, micro data on 
labour surveys would help to classify the workers 
by different features such as professional sector, lev-
el of education, skills, etc., for the sake of a deep-
er analysis.
Fig. 3. Linear Relationship NLI and EPL
(9)
After testing the two main hypotheses behind 
our model, the relationship between EPL on the 
one hand and the NLI and the probability of find-
ing employment on the other hand, we can test in 
a second step whether the EPL, through the chan-
nel of the expected NLI, shapes workers’ decisions 
about where to work and live. We will examine the 
correlation between the average expected NLI for 
the period 2008–2015, calculated on the basis of our 
previous results, and the average migration inflow 
/ net migration (IM/NM) for the same period. The 
data used are displayed in Table 3 below:
Table 3 shows in detail how the countries with 
the lowest have higher expected NLI, while 
those with the highest have the lowest ex-
pected NLI and, as a consequence, they attract few-
er workers, in gross or net figures. However, a more 
synthetic insight is provided using econometric 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics 1
ENLI IM NM Pop
BE -52.63 5,270.72 24,119.5 8,776.25 10,986,558
DE -59.85 10,161.02 108,579.875 33,030.75 81,132,645
EE -16.28 1,268.47 521.25 1,326,651
ES 46.59 416.36 25,767.125 -695.375 46,446,234
LV -9.01 581.31 562 2,075,744
LU -75.31 7,433.27 8,115.875 4,267 520,716
NT -70.58 9,566.19 25,064.25 6,888.25 16,670,239
AT -59.22 8,250.15 29,795.25 11,697.13 8,415,311
PT 13.30 359.43 2,957.25 10.511,795
SV -15.679 993.78 1,248.375 1,114.38 2,047,259
SK -3.72 376.22 851.25 662.13 5,399,222
FI -48.88 3,492.06 5,662.25 4,418.38 5,388,058
Table 4. Regression table 3
log(IM) log(NM)






t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Fig. 4. The relationship between IM/NM and ENLI
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4. Conclusions
Among all the factors that drive labour migration, 
governments face some difficulties in controlling 
the wages-related ones, since they involve negoti-
ations with multiple regulatory frameworks and 
stakeholders along both the public and the private 
sector. On the other hand, there are issues that re-
main even more difficult to manage, occasionally 
almost uncontrollable, like waves of refugees, ter-
ritorial conflicts between states, or border controls. 
The EPL should be considered a political and man-
agerial tool, easily adjusted with regard to current 
circumstances, especially under economic crisis sit-
uations.
Long ago, Robert Mundell (Mundell, 1961) pro-
phetically stated that the mobility of labour force 
in the context of a unified currency area would be 
a very useful adjustment mechanism against asym-
metric shocks, similar to the recent ones that hit 
Europe from 2008 to 2015. The empirical data pro-
cessed in the analysis above confirm that the labour 
flows tend to cushion asymmetric shocks (Kahan-
ec, 2013). The equilibrium of working force move-
ment follows a market supply-demand pattern. The 
countries hit by the crisis lose forces and resourc-
es, which are transferred to other countries with 
comparative economic advantages in that certain 
moment. In terms of physics, it is a case study of 
“vasi communicanti” where the liquid moving from 
one vase to another is the workers along with their 
needs, facing flowing constraints like bottlenecks 
and puzzled societies, which usually obstruct the 
flow to adjust to the multifaceted changes of glo-
balisation (O’Rourke and Taylor, 2013).
Finally, yet importantly, this paper offers clear-
cut evidence that have endured the model speci-
fications as well as the robustness checks, further 
resulting in policy-making implications. As shown 
in the previous section, the Euro Zone as a whole is 
far from having an average EPL level that maximis-
es the utility of workers, since the is smaller 
than -1. However, the figures displayed in the table 
show that there is no room for a “one size fits all” 
policy. In this sense, we can classify countries into 
three group: close to the optimal point, to the right 
of the optimal point and to the left of the optimal 
point. Therefore, each group should apply different 
measures, provided they intend to maximise work-
er utility. While the first group can keep the sta-
tus quo, the second one should try to reduce
and the third one to increase it. An important re-
mark to be highlighted about the second category 
of countries is that trade unions are not acting as 
monopolists in the field of social dialogue, at least 
concerning EPL (Tirole et al., 1988), despite the lat-
est complaints about their excessive power in Portu-
gal, Spain or Greece. Moreover, such a coordinated 
movement could help some countries to avoid risk-
ing partners’ labour force, since it is already prov-
en that workers move to countries with higher NLI 
and this, in turn, is strongly determined by the op-
timal choice of the EPL.
Nevertheless, there are different political tools to 
which governments can resort in order to get clos-
er to the optimal point. We will list the main three 
that stem from our model. Firstly, they may change 
the level of the EPL. In this case, countries where 
< -1 should increase the EPL until the de-
crease in the probability of finding a job offsets the 
gain from the higher NLI; while countries where
> -1 should decrease the EPL until the in-
crease in the probability of finding a job offsets the 
loss from the lower NLI.
Secondly, they may act over the NLI through 
income and fiscal policies like minimum wages, 
bargained wages, employee and employer social 
contributions, taxes on labour, etc. Thus, countries 
like Spain should implement income and fiscal pol-
icies aiming to reduce the NLI, while others, like 
Germany, may push to increase NLI. It is worth 
noting that there are three channels here affecting 
the . On the one hand, we are directly de-
creasing (or increasing) the numerator of the first 
term of the elasticity formula, hence the latter is in-
creasing (or decreasing). On the other hand, we are 
indirectly moving over the curve that links P and 
NLI and, as a conclusion, a decrease in the NLI 
leads to an increase in , and vice versa, and 
thus the curve becomes flatter. Finally, after a cer-
tain time, we can expect the probability of finding 
a job to rise (or diminish) as a consequence of the 
lower (or higher) labour cost and the increase (or 
decrease) in hiring rates. The three channels com-
bine to decrease (increase) the .
Bereitgestellt von  European University Institute | Heruntergeladen  30.09.19 08:58   UTC
Carlos Coca Gamito, Georgios Baltos / Bulletin of Geography. Socio-economic Series / 45 (2019): 45–58 57
Last but not least, governments may try to affect 
the probability of finding a job. Nonetheless, they 
can act over such a variable only in a very indirect 
way and with uncertain results. For example, they 
can try to absorb – through public employment – 
part of the unemployed population who are com-
peting in the labour market looking for a job, thus 
increasing the probability of the rest finding em-
ployment. The mechanism would be similar to that 
previously described leading to two secondary in-
direct effects on the . Nevertheless, since we 
are acting over P, we must look at the inverse of the 
slope of P with respect to NLI, i.e. . In any 
case, the curve linking NLI and P will become flat-
ter and, after a period of time, we may expect a de-
crease in the NLI.
The problem with the last two methods of inter-
vention is that they imply a direct engagement of 
the government into the sphere of the private mar-
ket and this can cause tension, especially within a 
context of economic crisis when governments try to 
reduce public employment or salaries. On the oth-
er hand, regulation through EPL is not immediate-
ly felt by either workers or employers and, hence, it 
is more likely to succeed as a tool that acts mild-
ly but effectively to intervene in the labour market 
during a crisis.
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